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Introduction 
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen last December taught many lessons to the 
participating stakeholders. The European Union 
learned that a choir of European leaders could not sing 
convincingly even with a single voice. These lessons 
are still being processed in many national capitals and 
in Brussels, especially in the context of the new legal 
framework provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It is 
important to recognise, however, that the new rules 
came into effect only after nine long years of 
negotiations and its application is being tested in a 
wholly different international environment than 
prevailed in the early 2000s.  
For this reason, many questions are being re-examined 
in light of the new post-Copenhagen and post-Lisbon 
Treaty reality. This paper aims to explore the 
possibilities offered by the provisions and the ‘spirit’ 
of  the new Treaty in the context of the complex 
internal political situation in the EU. First, we present 
the previous decision-making system, which many 
stakeholders would like to see preserved. It was an 
acceptable way for all partners (the European 
Commission, the Member States) to organise the 
Union in international negotiations. Second, we 
examine the relevant provisions of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Third, we look at how the system can be 
reformed in order to improve the EU’s leverage and 
effectiveness in international negotiations.  
This paper does not examine the strategic and tactical 
choices made by the EU’s negotiators in the global 
climate talks. Rather, the ambition is to look at the 
institutional and organisational  arrangements of the 
process, which by themselves alone would not be 
sufficient to ensure success; but which are nevertheless 
necessary for success.  
L’ancien régime 
To illustrate the Union’s preparations for and 
negotiations of international agreements in external 
dimensions to internal EU policies, it is best to 
examine a specific example that would be applicable in 
other areas, such as consumer protection, transport, 
freedom, security and justice or fisheries. This is the 
case of EU environment policy. Legislation in this area 
is the result of the co-decision process between the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
Preparations for the EU mandate in international 
negotiations were managed primarily in the Council. 
Specific working parties prepared draft proposals, 
which then were adopted by Coreper I and the 
Environment Council. In extreme cases, when internal 
EU talks on the mandate provided for the negotiations 
would be of great complexity and importance, the 
issue would be referred to the European Council. This 
was the case of the Copenhagen EU mandate, which 
was adopted during the October 2009 European 
Council.
1 
                                                      
1 See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 29-30 
October 2009 (para. 4-25). 
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The EU-led negotiations themselves were managed by 
the EU Troika, which was composed of the EU 
rotating Presidency (in December 2009: Sweden), the 
incoming EU rotating Presidency (Spain), and the 
European Commission. The Troika was also assisted 
by the staff of the General Secretariat of the Council of 
the European Union. 
A defining feature of the pre-Lisbon system was the 
fact, in addition to the official EU representation, 
individual EU stakeholders were still full participants 
in the negotiations as UN members. As a result, even 
in the absence of a cacophony of voices (single voice), 
there was still a problem with a multiplication of 
political representations, which had the effect of 
undermining of the official EU negotiators’ position.  
Agreeing on and preserving the single voice was never 
easy. When 27 diverse states agreed on a joint 
position, a certain degree of inflexibility was built into 
that very position. Limited trust among European 
leaders only contributed to the design of a negotiations 
mandate that included not only the objectives of the 
negotiations, but also a long list of restrictions on how 
they could be achieved. The same limited trust 
increased the inflexibility of the EU position. Any 
radical shift in negotiations would necessitate another 
informal gathering of European leaders who would ad 
hoc decide to change the EU joint position. In the 
meantime, other stakeholders could wait for the EU to 
agree… or not and pursue the process without the 
Europeans. 
Multilateral international negotiations are managed at 
many levels simultaneously. The EU lacked a 
comprehensive set of instruments enabling it to 
manage those negotiations effectively. Each of the 
rotating presidencies relied on its national web of 
diplomatic missions and the Commission, on its 
network of delegations to third countries. In the UN 
climate change process, extra resources were also 
necessary. Hence some Member States’ diplomats 
participated in activities aimed at building coalitions 
during the negotiations.  
As a result, the system became quite complex; 
duplication of effort and shortcomings became 
unavoidable. For example, the EU negotiations with 
third parties became vulnerable to the dedication of 
national diplomats, many of whom had very little EU 
professional experience. Those activities were not 
centralised with the consequence that some EU 
Member States were reluctant to share with fellow EU 
states, including the Presidency, information gained 
through bilateral talks with third countries. 
The system contained some positive characteristics, 
the most important ones deriving from the diversity of 
EU Member States and their diplomatic cultures. 
Certain EU Member States possess excellent 
knowledge about third states (in terms of 
understanding their culture of negotiations), as a result 
of their former colonial possessions or through 
linguistic or religious proximity. Proper application of 
these unique skills could facilitate a solution 
favourable to the EU in the wider international context. 
The Lisbon Changes 
Article 47 TEU states: “The European Union shall 
have legal personality.” This basic provision allows the 
Union to be represented in international negotiations. 
Before December 2009, there was a double 
explanation for the existence of Troikas. First, only the 
European Community had a legal international status 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy was 
conducted outside of the legally binding framework. 
Hence the European Commission could not represent 
the foreign policy aspects of the international 
negotiations; this could be done only through the 
political representation of the Member States. Since 1 
December 2009, this dualism of what the “Union” is 
has been removed as the European Union has a full 
legal personality. 
The second explanation of Troikas is based on the fact 
that in most international negotiations the competence 
of the Union (legally, the Community) was shared 
between the Union (Community) and the individual 
Member States. Hence both sides of the system (the 
Commission, Member States) needed to be present at 
the table since all of them executed a shared 
competence. This issue has not changed in the context 
of climate change policy, which under the Lisbon 
Treaty remains a shared competence between the 
Union (now with a legal personality) and the members 
of the EU. 
Nevertheless, the reasons for the Troika’s existence 
can be challenged by the new institutional system 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. At the European 
Council level, the rotating presidency has been 
replaced by the permanent President; in foreign affairs 
at the Council of Ministers level, the rotating 
presidency has been replaced by the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. In 
matters of external representation, the treaties are now 
more explicit than before. The Commission “…shall 
ensure the Union’s external representation (…)” with 
the exception of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
matters (here, this role lies with the High 
Representative).
2 It could mean that whenever the EU 
is to be represented it can be done only by the 
European Commission, High Representative or 
President of the European Council. No specific role for 
the rotating presidency is envisaged. 
Henceforth, the external representation of the EU in 
international negotiations poses two fundamental 
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questions: can and should the Troika remain? And if 
so, what is its composition and who should lead the 
way within it? 
The provisions on how the Union negotiates 
international agreements have also been changed.
3 In 
the case of non-foreign and security policy 
negotiations, the treaty provides for a procedure, that 
the Commission starts by sending a recommendation 
to the Council to open the talks. The Council then 
takes a formal decision to start the process and 
nominates a negotiator or the negotiating team’s head. 
The negotiations are carried out by the team (or a 
single person), but the Council can give directions to 
the negotiators and appoint a special committee, whose 
advice must be heeded by the Union’s negotiators. For 
the Council to conclude the agreement upon the 
negotiator(s) proposal, it needs to obtain the European 
Parliament’s consent (i.e. in climate negotiations) or 
opinion. The legislature also needs to be kept up to 
date on progress during the entire process. With few 
exceptions (i.e. association agreements), the Council 
takes the final decision by qualified majority vote. The 
European Court of Justice keeps an oversight over any 
agreement’s compatibility with the Treaties.  
The new elements are the following: 
•  The negotiations are carried out by the negotiator 
or negotiating team, and not necessarily by the 
Commission. 
•  The European Parliament’s right to consent to 
agreements has been significantly enlarged. 
•  The application of the majority vote in the Council 
has been widened. 
The new Treaty also creates the European External 
Action Service,
4 which should become the primary 
instrument for the Union negotiators to lead 
simultaneous bilateral negotiations with third partners. 
The way the national EU diplomacies are coordinated 
(previously by the rotating Presidency) would be 
determined by the High Representative.
5  
Political Reality Check 
There are at least three different types of representation 
in external policies of the Union: 1) policies in which 
the Union has exclusive competence (e.g. trade), 2) 
external dimensions of internal Union policies and 3) 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
demarcation between the external dimension of an 
internal Union policy, on the one hand, and the foreign 
and security policy, on the other hand, however, is not 
always clear. For example, the climate change 
                                                      
3 Article 218 TFEU. 
4 Art. 27 (3) TEU. 
5 Art. 34 (1) TEU. 
negotiations within the UN could (and for many 
reasons, should) also be regarded as a foreign policy, 
where the representation and guiding rules of this 
policy could apply. An element of this approach could 
already be discerned in the letter to the Heads of State 
or Government by President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy concerning the Informal 
meeting of 11 February 2010: the President indicated 
the need to “talk about the lessons to be drawn from 
Copenhagen for our relations with strategic partners”.
6  
Apart from the question of what kind of policy is being 
negotiated in the climate talks, there is also the issue of 
expectations of various stakeholders: the European 
Commission, the Member States and the new 
institutional actor – the European Parliament. The 
initial reaction in the national capitals in this respect 
was to agree to changes that are necessary, but not to 
move much further. Some states were also worried that 
taking a decision by a majority vote rather than by a 
consensus would limit their negotiating position within 
the Union. 
On the European Commission side, the following 
questions need to be addressed: 
•  Is the Commission ready to take the lead in seeing 
that the EU’s negotiators’ mandate is broader than 
it has been in the past? 
•  Is the Commission willing to propose becoming 
the Union’s sole negotiator (i.e. without the 
rotating Presidency and incoming Presidency)? 
•  If not, is the Commission willing to take the lead 
within the Troika in the negotiations (i.e. a shift 
from the rotating Presidency)? 
•  Who would be the Commission’s representative in 
the process? 
•  If the Commission’s representative would not be 
the High Representative, but a different 
Commissioner – what kind of relationship would 
there be between this Commissioner and the new 
External Action Service? 
In principle, the Commission seeks to increase its role 
in negotiating all international agreements. Wherever 
and whenever it is possible to agree with the Member 
States for the Commission to be the only EU 
negotiator (without the Member States represented by 
the rotating Presidency), this most likely is going to be 
the Commission’s objective.
7 Among the arguments 
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(beyond the Treaties) the Commission can advance for 
such a move are the benefits of a single representation 
(i.e. efficiency). However, the obvious cost in those 
cases is usually a tighter negotiating mandate. 
In cases where a unified representation in international 
negotiations is unacceptable for Member States, the 
Troikas shall remain, as already demonstrated in the 
UNFCCC process.
8 Within the Troika, however, the 
Commission aspires to play the role of leader: “A 
stronger role for the Commission will help ensure that 
the EU speaks with one voice”.
9 
In 2009, the Commission’s representative in the 
climate talks was the Environment Commissioner 
Stavros Dimas, but within the new College (in office 
since February 2010) there is a new Commissioner for 
Climate Action. Her mandate is to play 
...a central role in continuing EU leadership 
in fighting climate change and leading our 
[EU’s] negotiations on climate as well as 
helping the EU to deal with the 
consequences of climate change...
10 
Therefore if the responsibility now resides with the 
Commissioner on Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, 
who is to have a central role for all the Union’s 
actions, there is a natural expectation on the part of the 
External Action Service to be at her disposal.  
There are, however, two points that may make the 
Commission’s plan for action difficult. First, there is a 
potential reluctance among Member States to allow the 
Commission to play the central role in leading the 
Union’s efforts in climate negotiations (also in terms 
of physical presence in Cancun in 
November/December 2010). There might even be 
attempts to undermine Commissioner Hedegaard’s 
internal leadership in the process. A second 
problematic issue relates to the negotiators’ mandate. 
At the end of the day in Cancun, the Union may find 
itself in similar situation to that experienced in 
Copenhagen: the mandate given to the Union’s 
representatives might be too tight and might require 
the presence of additional EU leaders on the spot. In 
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8 In an interview, a stakeholder indicated that the Commission 
proposed to keep the joint system of representation (Commission 
and Member States) in the UN climate negotiations, but the 
decision had not been taken at the time of writing. 
9 Communication from the Commission, “International climate 
policy post-Copenhagen: Acting now to reinvigorate global action 
on climate change”, COM 2010 (86) final, Brussels, 9 March 2010, 
p. 5. 
10 Commissioner Connie Hedegaard’s mandate provided by 
President Barroso on 27 November 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/hedegaard/about/mandate/hedegaard_climate_en.pdf).  
the meantime, other global stakeholders might decide 
not to wait for the Europeans… 
There is also a new internal EU stakeholder, the 
European Parliament. Members of the legislature are 
very interested in the UN climate process and will 
have a say in accepting any final accord. The 
parliamentarians have shown the ambition to enlarge 
their collective influence beyond the Treaty’s 
provisions. For example, in the context of international 
negotiations, they would like to have a say in the 
negotiators’ mandate. Additionally, the Commission 
envisages a role for the EP to “engage fully with 
parliamentarians from key partner countries.”
11 
Two Options 
There seems to be an expectation that the new Treaty 
of Lisbon can ensure greater efficiency of the Union’s 
actions and provide for increased leverage in 
international negotiations. For this to happen, however, 
two issues need to be examined. First is the question of 
the flexibility of the mandate of the EU negotiators. 
Second is the issue of EU representation at the next 
UN meetings.  
The international climate negotiations remain a shared 
competence where there are roles to be played by the 
European Union and its Member States. It is important 
to remember that the latter have every right to 
participate in the UN process as UN members. Their 
activities at the global level, however, cannot be 
managed independently of the EU policy. The Union 
and its Member States need to cooperate closely “both 
in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the 
fulfilment of the obligations entered into”.
12 
There can be various arrangements for organising that 
cooperation. In this regard, there are two main options 
on how to proceed with the organisation of the EU’s 
international negotiations on climate matters. 
The first option is based on the logic of adapting the 
old system to the new rules by introducing only those 
changes that are unavoidable. The Treaty can be 
interpreted in a way that allows for a narrow 
adaptation as if there were no major changes. 
Therefore there would remain: 
•  Division of competences and labour between the 
Commission and the Member States; and 
•  Representation of the Member States provided by 
the rotating Presidency of the Council. 
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This new system – favoured by some Member States – 
needs to be confronted with the latest political events. 
The single most important political development in 
this regard is the appearance of the Climate Action 
Commissioner in the European Commission, who 
would have the European External Action Service at 
her disposal to lead the process forward. Would the 
Member States provide Ms. Hedegaard with a limited 
mandate? Probably they would. Would they also 
challenge her leadership in the process? The answer to 
this question remains open. 
As for the representation at the next UN meetings, the 
composition of the Troika would not change, but the 
role of the European Commission should become 
central in the process. It would, however, be advisable 
to limit the EU’s representation. For example, there 
could be a joint Commission-rotating Presidency duo 
managing the negotiations on behalf of the European 
Union. Representation would therefore be limited to 
two actors and the incoming EU rotating Presidency 
would not be incorporated into the process. Within the 
duo the Commission would take the lead. This would 
limit the confusion experienced by many third parties’ 
representatives and could allow for enhanced 
efficiency and possibly yield even greater leverage. 
There would emerge, however, new problems of 
instability and discontinuity in the system by not 
having the incoming rotating presidencies engaged in 
the process. These can be addressed by delegating the 
negotiations of various international agreements to one 
Presidency over a period longer than six months (even 
an 18-month collaboration between trio-presidencies
13 
could be envisaged). This is already a standard 
procedure in other policies, e.g. states with no sea 
access often delegate management of international 
agreements in fisheries to other presidencies (incoming 
or outgoing).  
At the summit level, the representation of the Union 
would still be provided by a set of EU and EU Member 
State leaders. It is important to remember that all EU 
Member States are UN members and have every right 
to be present if they wish to be there. More 
importantly, however, should the negotiations go 
beyond the given mandate, the presence of EU leaders 
on the spot can be extremely useful. The change in 
climate negotiations since Copenhagen in December 
2009 should be that EU Member State leaders are not 
engaged at all in the negotiations and their role is 
primarily ceremonial; they would be present in case 
ad-hoc internal EU consultations were necessary. 
There would be no role for the German Chancellor, the 
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British Prime Minister or the French President – or any 
other EU Member State leader – to discuss with third 
partners. This self-limitation on the side of the EU’s 
most prominent politicians could be a price worth 
paying. In exchange, the leverage of EU representation 
– provided at this level by Presidents Barroso and Van 
Rompuy (as a head of the European Council; hence a 
representative of 27 heads of state or government) – 
should increase. President Barroso would represent the 
Union in the negotiations at the highest level; President 
Van Rompuy’s responsibility would be to consult with 
the Member States whenever necessary.  
Under such an arrangement, both the efficiency and 
leverage of the Union are increased. It might not be 
enough to guarantee a final global agreement, but it 
might be sufficient to ensure that the EU has a say in 
the process at each stage of the negotiations. 
The second option is to structure the EU’s 
representation in climate affairs in a manner as similar 
as possible to that adopted in commercial negotiations. 
Trade is an exclusive EU competence – climate change 
is not. The EU-27 as a bloc is the world’s largest trade 
actor; it does not rank among the world’s largest 
emitters of greenhouse gases. Clearly, there are major 
differences in the EU position in trade talks and in 
climate negotiations. At the same time, in trade talks 
the leverage and effectiveness of the EU are much 
greater than in any other sectoral policy of the EU. Not 
only is no agreement possible without the Union 
supporting it, but there is virtually no way to sideline 
the EU in the process. Therefore, we must ask whether 
there are lesson to draw from the trade negotiations 
that could be applicable in the climate talks. 
If the logic of the Union’s climate negotiations was not 
bottom up (consensus among 27 taken to the global 
level), but rather top down (objective- and results-
oriented), the post-Lisbon representation of the Union 
in the process could also look like this:  
•  A  broad mandate provided for the Union’s 
negotiator (Climate Action Commissioner) by the 
Council; 
•  Negotiations led by the negotiator under the 
control of the Council (through the special 
committee) and the Parliament (reporting); 
•  Negotiations with third countries managed 
exclusively through the External Action Service 
under the supervision of the Climate Action 
Commissioner; 
•  Representation at the highest level provided by the 
Commission President (as a non-CFSP and non-
European Council issue) and no EU Member State 
leaders present (with the European Council 
President consulted by phone if necessary); 6 | Piotr Maciej Kaczyński 
•  Real-life possibility of rejecting the agreement in 
the legislative process by the Council (by a 
majority vote) or the Parliament (consent); and 
•  Any new international law-binding instrument 
would still need to be agreed to and adhered to by 
all EU-27 Member States (as UN members) and 
the EU; effectively providing them with individual 
veto power. Possibly, even a similar solution as in 
the case of the EU’s accession to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms could be envisaged.
14 
The primary problem in such a system is the 
applicability of its logic. It would be difficult for many 
Member States to agree not to tightly control the EU 
negotiators throughout the entire process. Why would 
a country give up an effective veto power (an 
expectation from the mandate to be adopted 
consensually) in exchange for an illusion of veto 
power (difficult to implement individually at the end of 
the process under a political pressure)? This kind of 
thinking plays into the limited trust that exists already 
between many of the Member States and the European 
Commission.  
In this scenario the self-imposed limitations on the 
European leaders would be even more far-reaching 
than in the first scenario. It is simply unimaginable that 
leaders of UN Security Council member states would 
absent themselves from a gathering 100+ global 
leaders.  
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Conclusion 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides for more clarity on how 
the EU can manage the negotiation of international 
treaties. The process should be led by the European 
Commission or the High Representative – not the 
Member State of the rotating Presidency. The 
European Parliament is also more engaged in the 
process; it could exert pressure on other EU 
institutions to allow for greater centralisation of the 
Union’s representation in negotiating international 
agreements. The role of Member States should be 
supplementary, but still providing for full ownership of 
all EU members over the final product. The problems 
are well known. One is the unwillingness of Member 
States to step back and of certain leaders to refrain 
from trying to take the lead – the temptation of glory 
and the illusion of power are still there. Another 
concerns timing – the new EU institutions are only 
settling in; the new diplomatic corps will by no means 
be fully operational for a few years yet. Compounding 
these problems is the fact that the EU is becoming less 
relevant in climate negotiations because it is making a 
determined effort to cut its greenhouse gas emissions 
while other countries continue to increase theirs.  
And the most significant question of all: Will the 
changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon be 
sufficient to allow the EU to reassert its relevance on 
the world stage? After all, perhaps the correct answer 
should be looked for not so much in the institutional 
design of the Union’s representation in international 
talks, but more in the substance of what Union brings 
to the table. 